x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as encrypted by default

Currently memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) can produce decrypted/shared mapping:

  memremap(MEMREMAP_WB)
    arch_memremap_wb()
      ioremap_cache()
        __ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)

In such cases, the IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED flag on the memory will determine
if the resulting mapping is encrypted or decrypted.

Creating a decrypted mapping without explicit request from the caller is
risky:

  - It can inadvertently expose the guest's data and compromise the
    guest.

  - Accessing private memory via shared/decrypted mapping on TDX will
    either trigger implicit conversion to shared or #VE (depending on
    VMM implementation).

    Implicit conversion is destructive: subsequent access to the same
    memory via private mapping will trigger a hard-to-debug #VE crash.

The kernel already provides a way to request decrypted mapping
explicitly via the MEMREMAP_DEC flag.

Modify memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) to produce encrypted/private mapping by
default unless MEMREMAP_DEC is specified or if the kernel runs on
a machine with SME enabled.

It fixes the crash due to #VE on kexec in TDX guests if CONFIG_EISA is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217163822.343400-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com