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  1. May 09, 2013
    • Tyler Hicks's avatar
      eCryptfs: Use the ablkcipher crypto API · 4dfea4f0
      Tyler Hicks authored 
      

Make the switch from the blkcipher kernel crypto interface to the
ablkcipher interface.

encrypt_scatterlist() and decrypt_scatterlist() now use the ablkcipher
interface but, from the eCryptfs standpoint, still treat the crypto
operation as a synchronous operation. They submit the async request and
then wait until the operation is finished before they return. Most of
the changes are contained inside those two functions.

Despite waiting for the completion of the crypto operation, the
ablkcipher interface provides performance increases in most cases when
used on AES-NI capable hardware.

Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: default avatarColin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarZeev Zilberman <zeev@annapurnaLabs.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Ying Huang <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Thieu Le <thieule@google.com>
Cc: Li Wang <dragonylffly@163.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@iki.fi>
      4dfea4f0
  3. Apr 26, 2013
  5. Apr 18, 2013
  7. Apr 17, 2013
  9. Apr 13, 2013
    • Suleiman Souhlal's avatar
      vfs: Revert spurious fix to spinning prevention in prune_icache_sb · 5b55d708
      Suleiman Souhlal authored 
      

Revert commit 62a3ddef ("vfs: fix spinning prevention in prune_icache_sb").

This commit doesn't look right: since we are looking at the tail of the
list (sb->s_inode_lru.prev) if we want to skip an inode, we should put
it back at the head of the list instead of the tail, otherwise we will
keep spinning on it.

Discovered when investigating why prune_icache_sb came top in perf
reports of a swapping load.

Signed-off-by: default avatarSuleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.2+
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5b55d708
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      Btrfs: make sure nbytes are right after log replay · 4bc4bee4
      Josef Bacik authored 
      

While trying to track down a tree log replay bug I noticed that fsck was always
complaining about nbytes not being right for our fsynced file.  That is because
the new fsync stuff doesn't wait for ordered extents to complete, so the inodes
nbytes are not necessarily updated properly when we log it.  So to fix this we
need to set nbytes to whatever it is on the inode that is on disk, so when we
replay the extents we can just add the bytes that are being added as we replay
the extent.  This makes it work for the case that we have the wrong nbytes or
the case that we logged everything and nbytes is actually correct.  With this
I'm no longer getting nbytes errors out of btrfsck.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
      4bc4bee4
  11. Apr 12, 2013
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      kthread: Prevent unpark race which puts threads on the wrong cpu · f2530dc7
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      

The smpboot threads rely on the park/unpark mechanism which binds per
cpu threads on a particular core. Though the functionality is racy:

CPU0	       	 	CPU1  	     	    CPU2
unpark(T)				    wake_up_process(T)
  clear(SHOULD_PARK)	T runs
			leave parkme() due to !SHOULD_PARK  
  bind_to(CPU2)		BUG_ON(wrong CPU)						    

We cannot let the tasks move themself to the target CPU as one of
those tasks is actually the migration thread itself, which requires
that it starts running on the target cpu right away.

The solution to this problem is to prevent wakeups in park mode which
are not from unpark(). That way we can guarantee that the association
of the task to the target cpu is working correctly.

Add a new task state (TASK_PARKED) which prevents other wakeups and
use this state explicitly for the unpark wakeup.

Peter noticed: Also, since the task state is visible to userspace and
all the parked tasks are still in the PID space, its a good hint in ps
and friends that these tasks aren't really there for the moment.

The migration thread has another related issue.

CPU0	      	     	 CPU1
Bring up CPU2
create_thread(T)
park(T)
 wait_for_completion()
			 parkme()
			 complete()
sched_set_stop_task()
			 schedule(TASK_PARKED)

The sched_set_stop_task() call is issued while the task is on the
runqueue of CPU1 and that confuses the hell out of the stop_task class
on that cpu. So we need the same synchronizaion before
sched_set_stop_task().

Reported-by: default avatarDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: default avatarPeter Ziljstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: dhillf@gmail.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1304091635430.21884@ionos


Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      f2530dc7
  13. Apr 10, 2013
  15. Apr 09, 2013
  17. Apr 05, 2013
    • Trond Myklebust's avatar
      NFSv4/4.1: Fix bugs in nfs4[01]_walk_client_list · 7b1f1fd1
      Trond Myklebust authored 
      

It is unsafe to use list_for_each_entry_safe() here, because
when we drop the nn->nfs_client_lock, we pin the _current_ list
entry and ensure that it stays in the list, but we don't do the
same for the _next_ list entry. Use of list_for_each_entry() is
therefore the correct thing to do.

Also fix the refcounting in nfs41_walk_client_list().

Finally, ensure that the nfs_client has finished being initialised
and, in the case of NFSv4.1, that the session is set up.

Signed-off-by: default avatarTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>= 3.7]
      7b1f1fd1
    • Trond Myklebust's avatar
      NFSv4: Fix a memory leak in nfs4_discover_server_trunking · b193d59a
      Trond Myklebust authored 
      

When we assign a new rpc_client to clp->cl_rpcclient, we need to destroy
the old one.

Signed-off-by: default avatarTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.7]
      b193d59a
    • Bob Peterson's avatar
      GFS2: Issue discards in 512b sectors · b2c87cae
      Bob Peterson authored 
      

This patch changes GFS2's discard issuing code so that it calls
function sb_issue_discard rather than blkdev_issue_discard. The
code was calling blkdev_issue_discard and specifying the correct
sector offset and sector size, but blkdev_issue_discard expects
these values to be in terms of 512 byte sectors, even if the native
sector size for the device is different. Calling sb_issue_discard
with the BLOCK size instead ensures the correct block-to-512b-sector
translation. I verified that "minlen" is specified in blocks, so
comparing it to a number of blocks is correct.

Signed-off-by: default avatarBob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSteven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
      b2c87cae
  19. Apr 04, 2013
  21. Apr 03, 2013
    • Zheng Liu's avatar
      ext4: fix big-endian bugs which could cause fs corruptions · 8cde7ad1
      Zheng Liu authored 
      

When an extent was zeroed out, we forgot to do convert from cpu to le16.
It could make us hit a BUG_ON when we try to write dirty pages out.  So
fix it.

[ Also fix a bug found by Dmitry Monakhov where we were missing
  le32_to_cpu() calls in the new indirect punch hole code.

  There are a number of other big endian warnings found by static code
  analyzers, but we'll wait for the next merge window to fix them all
  up.  These fixes are designed to be Obviously Correct by code
  inspection, and easy to demonstrate that it won't make any
  difference (and hence, won't introduce any bugs) on little endian
  architectures such as x86.  --tytso ]

Signed-off-by: default avatarZheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: default avatarCAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Reported-by: default avatarChristian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Cc: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
      8cde7ad1
  23. Apr 01, 2013
    • Anatol Pomozov's avatar
      loop: prevent bdev freeing while device in use · c1681bf8
      Anatol Pomozov authored 
      

struct block_device lifecycle is defined by its inode (see fs/block_dev.c) -
block_device allocated first time we access /dev/loopXX and deallocated on
bdev_destroy_inode. When we create the device "losetup /dev/loopXX afile"
we want that block_device stay alive until we destroy the loop device
with "losetup -d".

But because we do not hold /dev/loopXX inode its counter goes 0, and
inode/bdev can be destroyed at any moment. Usually it happens at memory
pressure or when user drops inode cache (like in the test below). When later in
loop_clr_fd() we want to use bdev we have use-after-free error with following
stack:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000280
  bd_set_size+0x10/0xa0
  loop_clr_fd+0x1f8/0x420 [loop]
  lo_ioctl+0x200/0x7e0 [loop]
  lo_compat_ioctl+0x47/0xe0 [loop]
  compat_blkdev_ioctl+0x341/0x1290
  do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
  compat_sys_ioctl+0xc1/0xf20
  do_sys_open+0x16e/0x1d0
  sysenter_dispatch+0x7/0x1a

To prevent use-after-free we need to grab the device in loop_set_fd()
and put it later in loop_clr_fd().

The issue is reprodusible on current Linus head and v3.3. Here is the test:

  dd if=/dev/zero of=loop.file bs=1M count=1
  while [ true ]; do
    losetup /dev/loop0 loop.file
    echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
    losetup -d /dev/loop0
  done

[ Doing bdgrab/bput in loop_set_fd/loop_clr_fd is safe, because every
  time we call loop_set_fd() we check that loop_device->lo_state is
  Lo_unbound and set it to Lo_bound If somebody will try to set_fd again
  it will get EBUSY.  And if we try to loop_clr_fd() on unbound loop
  device we'll get ENXIO.

  loop_set_fd/loop_clr_fd (and any other loop ioctl) is called under
  loop_device->lo_ctl_mutex. ]

Signed-off-by: default avatarAnatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c1681bf8
  25. Mar 29, 2013
  27. Mar 28, 2013
  29. Mar 27, 2013
    • Al Viro's avatar
      vfs/splice: Fix missed checks in new __kernel_write() helper · 3e84f48e
      Al Viro authored 
      

Commit 06ae43f3 ("Don't bother with redoing rw_verify_area() from
default_file_splice_from()") lost the checks to test existence of the
write/aio_write methods.  My apologies ;-/

Eventually, we want that in fs/splice.c side of things (no point
repeating it for every buffer, after all), but for now this is the
obvious minimal fix.

Reported-by: default avatarDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3e84f48e
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted · 87a8ebd6
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      

Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.

proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.

Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.

In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      87a8ebd6
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces · 132c94e3
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      

As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.

Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.

When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.

This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      132c94e3
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts · 90563b19
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      

When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher
privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged
user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only
restriction.

Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must
remain read-only.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      90563b19
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted · 3151527e
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      

Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.

Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.

For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace.  Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.

Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead.  With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      3151527e
  31. Mar 26, 2013
    • Al Viro's avatar
      Nest rename_lock inside vfsmount_lock · 7ea600b5
      Al Viro authored 
      

... lest we get livelocks between path_is_under() and d_path() and friends.

The thing is, wrt fairness lglocks are more similar to rwsems than to rwlocks;
it is possible to have thread B spin on attempt to take lock shared while thread
A is already holding it shared, if B is on lower-numbered CPU than A and there's
a thread C spinning on attempt to take the same lock exclusive.

As the result, we need consistent ordering between vfsmount_lock (lglock) and
rename_lock (seq_lock), even though everything that takes both is going to take
vfsmount_lock only shared.

Spotted-by: default avatarBrad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      7ea600b5